Possible worlds semantics has been very useful in modelling not only the intensionality of necessity and possibility, future and past. It has also found its place in modelling the intentionality of propositional attitudes like belief and knowledge. There is something fruitful in analysing a belief as a set of possible worlds. The belief is the set of possible worlds in which the belief is true. The belief is true i the actual world is in the corresponding set of propositions. The possible worlds in the set corresponding to the belief represent how the agent perceives the world to be. If the belief is false, then the world isn't how the agent sees the world to be, and so the actual world isn't in the set of worlds corresponding to the belief 4, 9 .
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The same can be said of whole belief states just as much as it can be said of individual beliefs. My belief state is the set of worlds consistent with what I believe. This view has been very fruitful, not least because the set-theoretic structure of sets of possible worlds correspnods nicely with the logical structure of entailment relations among propositions and the behaviour of propositional connectives like conjunction, disjunction and negation.
However, the story does not deal well with inconsistent belief. Inconsistent beliefs are true in no possible worlds, so they are each modelled by the same set of worlds | the empty set. My beliefs are often inconsistent, and so are those of many o f y ou. For example, people have laboured under the misconception that there are integers x; y; z and n 2 such that x n + y n = z n . As we n o w know, this is impossible. Frege thought for years that na ve set theory was consistent. Russell showed us that this theory is inconsistent. David Lewis gives a more homely example I used to think that Nassau Street ran roughly east-west; that the railroad nearby ran roughly north-south; and that the two were roughly parallel. By roughly" I mean to within 20 ". So each sentence in an inconsistent triple was true according to my beliefs, but not everything was true according to my beliefs. 3 , page 436. In each of these cases, there are no possible worlds consistent with the agent's explicit beliefs. Yet clearly, the agent's belief sets display a degree of logical coherence. There is a sense in which the agents beliefs form a corpus of information, closed under some sort of consequence relation, even if they are inconsistent. Lewis notes this and posits four desiderata for an account of truth according to a body of information".
We can reasonably ask that a conception of truth according to a corpus satisfy the following desiderata. 1 Anything that is explicitly a rmed in the corpus is true according to it. Maybe not all inconsistencies can be quarantined successfully, but many can be. 4 A sentence is false according to the corpus if and only if its negation is true according to the corpus. 3 , page 435. Lewis goes on to develop an account which has these four properties. I'll call it the chunking account as it treats inconsistency by partitioning the agents beliefs into consistent subsets 3, 4 . Take the case of Nassau Street and the railway.
Lewis holds A, that Nassau street runs east-west, B, that the railway runs northsouth, and C, that they run parallel. For Lewis, the way to understand this is to see the agent's beliefs as chunked" into separate categories, to quarantine the inconsistency. The agent no longer has one real belief set, but several. One, perhaps, in which A^C is true, and one, perhaps, where B^C is true. But none in which A^B^C is true. These consistent belief sets are treated as before, as giving rise to sets of possible worlds, which then are used to see the content of the beliefs. An agent's beliefs are those which appear in at least one of the corresponding belief sets. The agent here believes A^C, and B^C, but not A^B^C, as this appears in neither theory.
This chunking" account clearly gets something right. 1 Not all beliefs are available to be compared and conjoined with all other beliefs at all times. However, it has problems. I will consider just a few.
Firstly, Lewis doesn't tell give us a principled way of nding the relevant consistent subsets of the agent's explicit beliefs. There are many w a ys to generate such sets. How many of the agent's beliefs are we to add to A^C?
Secondly, the procedure of nding consistent subsets of a set of propositions is not in general even decidable, so even nding the inputs with which to perform our logical consequences to nd the nal belief set is not computable.
Thirdly, not all inconsistent beliefs are formed by conjoining two or more consistent beliefs. The straightforward way of reading Fermat's last theorem and of na ve set theory seem to be examples of this. There may be a way o f analysing these sorts of inconsistent beliefs under Lewis' analysis. However, to do so would probably take u s v ery far a eld from the surface grammar" of the beliefs in question.
Finally, consider what the agent does when discovering that he or she holds inconsistent beliefs. They perform the deduction, see that they're committed to A^B^C and see that they must reject something if they are to remain consistent. What can they do? One plausible way of describing the situation is as follows: They realise that according to their beliefs A^B^C holds, but they know independently that A^B^C . They are holding obviously inconsistent beliefs. They know this is impossible, and they see which one they ought to modify in order to resolve the inconsistency. At this stage the beliefs are not quarantined in separate compartments. They are mingling, and it is only a result of this mingling that the agent realises that there is a problem. Lewis realises this I need not quarrel with anyone who wishes to put forward a fth desideratum for a conception of truth according to a corpus: 5 the orthodox rules for^and _ must apply without exception : : :
What I doubt is that there is any useful and intuitive conception that satis es all ve desiderata. When asked to respect 1 4, I come up with a conception that violates 5. 3 , page 438. In what follows I will construct a notion of truth according to a corpus" which respects all ve conditions. One obvious way to do this is to start with a di erent logic. A paraconsistent logic is one in which the inference A; A`B fails. If we choose such a logic, we can construct impossible worlds" on a par with possible worlds as sets of propositions satisfying some maximality condition and closed under consequence. A set can contain both A and A without being the total set of all propositions. This technique is helpful for those who understand the logics used, but it is not helpful for those who nd the logic obscure.
In this paper I will proceed in the other direction. I will use the techniques readily available to theorists like Lewis and Stalnaker | possible worlds and a rst-order language, related in the usual classical way | and out of this machinery we will see how impossible worlds" can be constructed in a wellmotivated way. Then nally, the logic is read o the semantics. It will turn out in the end to be a familiar paraconsistent logic. However, it will be motivated by our semantic considerations, not imposed from the outset.
Propositional Logic
Let's start with propositional logic to see how the technique works in a simple context.
Definition 1 A propositional model is a set W of possible worlds, a set P of atomic propositions, and an interpretation relating atomic propositions to worlds. The relation is then extended to the entire vocabulary in the usual way.
x A^B i x A and x B x A _ B i x A or x B x A i x 6 A These models are standard fare. Given such a model, a proposition A is possible i there is some world w where w A. It is impossible otherwise. Clearly contradictions, of the form A A are impossible. However, other propositions might be impossible too. It might be that in the model, there is no possible world w such that w p, for some atomic proposition p. This is allowed by the constraints of the model. Now consider the case where there are three propositions, A, B and C which are each pairwise consistent but their conjunction A^B^C is inconsistent. So, there is no possible world w such that w A^B^C. What are we to say about a belief state which includes all three beliefs? We have already seen the Lewis Stalnaker account, which i s t o c h unk" the belief set into consistent compartments. There are no worlds at which the three-way conjunction is true, but there are worlds at which a n y pair are true. Our belief set is quarantined into consistent subsets. Say X is the set of all worlds in which A^B, Y is the set of all worlds in which A^C we could add Z, the set of worlds in which B^C if we wished, but X and Y are enough to illustrate the point. X and Y are disjoint. They together somehow represent the belief state of the inconsistent believer. How can we understand the belief set in a way which doesn't require it to be divided up? Consider X. Any w orld in X is consistent with part of the belief set, but not the whole. It is consistent with A^B, but not with A^C. If there were a world both in X and in Y , this would be enough to model A^B^C. Of course, there are no such worlds, as A^B^C is inconsistent. However, we can construct something to do the job. If x 2 X and y 2 Y , consider pasting together" x and y, like superimposing together two maps which inconsistently describe the landscape, or concatenating two stories which inconsistently describe the situation. How d o x and y together describe the world to be? There are many ways you could de ne this notion. I will chose a general framework for de ning the notion of truth at a set of possible worlds" which agrees with the notion of truth at a possible world in the case where the set of possible worlds in a singleton. The idea is that something is true in the set of possible worlds just when it's true in some member of that set. It is false in the set of possible worlds just when it is false in some member in that set. However, instead of leaving the condition at that which would simply be the chunking" idea all over again we will allow o v erlap. A conjunction is true at a set just when both conjuncts are true at that set. A conjunction is false at a set just when either conjunct is false. This leads to the following generalisation.
Definition 2 A world in a propositional model is a non-empty set of possible worlds in that model. Truth and falsity + and , are de ned for worlds in propositional models as follows.
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So, we h a v e an answer to our question what is a way the world can't be?" It is a set of ways the world can be. The world could be like x and it could be like y for two di erent possible worlds x and y. However, it can't both be like x and like y.
The de nition of , is a simple way of de ning truth in a model" which it will turn out satis es Lewis' ve desiderata. The following results show that the notion is well-behaved. Lemma These results go some way t o showing that the notion of truth and falsity a t a w orld in our sense is reasonably well behaved. Another way to understand the`logic' of the semantics is to examine how propositions behave. As is well known, on the`standard account' propositions can be modelled as sets of possible worlds the set of worlds at which the proposition is true. Then the logical operations of conjunction, disjunction and negation are modelled by the set theoretic operations of intersection, union and negation.
How are propositions modelled once we consider impossible worlds as well as possible worlds? Take a particular simple possible worlds model, and the relations + and , which arise from considering impossible worlds as well as possible ones. Consider the set of worlds that is, non-empty sets of possible worlds at which a proposition is true. What must this set be like? Well, Lemma 2 tells us that if X is in this set, so is any superset Y of X. That is, the set of worlds at which a proposition is true must be closed upwards. If X is in the set, so are all supersets of X.
A proposition, however, is not uniquely de ned by the set of worlds at which it is true. Consider the following simple model with two possible worlds a and b, at which a p q and b p q . Clearly X + p_ p and X + q for any nonempty set X of worlds. However, the propositions p _ p and q are importantly di erent. The negation of p _ p is true at one impossible world, fa; bg, whereas the negation of q is true nowhere | not even at fa; bg. So, propositions ought not be modelled just at the set of worlds at which they are true, but also at the set of worlds at which they are false. An appropriate model for propositions is as follows:
Definition 3 A proposition in a simple possible worlds model is a pair hX + ; X , i of sets of worlds, satsifying the following conditions:
Both X + and X , are closed upwards.
For any w 2 W, fwg is in exactly one of X + and X ,
In any proposition hX + ; X , i, X + is the set of worlds at which the proposition is true, and X , is the set of worlds at which it is false. As propositions are either true or false and not both at possible worlds, for each w 2 W, fwg must be in exactly one of X + and X , . It is simple to show that conjunction, disjunction and negation work as you would expect on these`propositions'. So propositions, in these models, have a richer structure than that in simple possible worlds models. However, the connectives maintain their simple set theoretic interpretation | complicated only by the need to keep track not only of where a proposition is true, but where it is also false. You might protest, and rightly so, that it seems that negation is not interpreted by set theoretic negation or complement but by a`swapping' operation. However, all is not lost | the two sets in the pair of sets area already related by a negation. For any possible world x, fxg is in X + or X , but not both. So, the set theoretic analogue of negation is still recognisably negative".
In fact, if you modelled old-style propositions, not as sets of possible worlds but as cuts" of the set of all possible worlds into two sets | one in which the proposition is true, and the other in which it is false | this would be a merely notational di erence. The logic would be the same. However, the de nitions of conjunction, disjunction and negation in such a modelling would be exactly the same as what we h a v e for our propositions. So, the de nition is not nonclassical" in the sense of changing the meanings of the connectives.
The resulting logic" is rather simple. Let's say that `P A P" for paraconsistent just when in each model, for each w orld X, i f X + B for each B 2 then X + A too. This is an extension of the standard de nition of consequence to our case in which w e admit impossible worlds. It turns out that the consequence relation`P so de ned is the consequence relation of Priest's paraconsistent logic lp 5 . An lp-evaluation is a function v from the language to the set f1g; f0g; f0; 1g of truth values`true',`false', and`both', satisfying the following conditions: We say that an argument from to A is lp-valid written``l p A' i for every lp-evaluation The converse is slightly more di cult to prove. Suppose that 6 lp A. We wish to construct a model containing a world X at which is true but A not. To d o this, consider an lp-valuation v for which each element of i s at least true, for which A is not. 0 , the set of formulae which are true at least according to v, is a superset of , such that 0 6 lp A. We wish to nd a world which makes each element of 0 true but not A. This is reasonably straightforward. The map v sends each atomic proposition to one of f0g, f1g and f0; 1g. Let the consistent sub-evaluations of v be the maps v 0 from the set of atomic propositions to the set f0; 1g be those maps v 0 such that for each p, if v 0 p = i then i 2 vp. and we let the usual inductive conditions do the work for the connectives. We don't care how evaluates propositions at other worlds if there are any for they are irrelevant for our purposes. We will take our world X to be the set of all the worlds wv 0 , where v 0 is a consistent-sub-evaluation of v. We need just show that X + B for each B 2 0 and that X 6 + A. We will do more. We will prove b y induction on B that So, if 6 LP A, we can construct a simple possible worlds model giving us 6 P A as follows. Take the lp-evaluation v which makes all of true but not A. Consider this evaluation and look at all of the consistent e v aluation which make it up. Take these to be the worlds which are inconsistently combined to model . They'll do this, and A will not be true there. So, you have a simple possible worlds model which i n v alidates `P A as desired.
What has this result shown? We can see that our de nition of truth in a world for both possible and impossible worlds agrees with a prior de nition of a paraconsistent logic. As a result, we can have two notions of truth according to a body of information. Firstly, y ou can chunk your belief set into consistent parts and consider those. Secondly, you can allow interaction between those parts to get an inconsistent theory, which still has a degree of logical closure. The notion of logical consequence relevant to these inconsistent theories is a pre-existing paraconsistent logic lp. We did not start out to motivate lp. We started out to consider a notion of truth in theory" which respected Lewis' ve desiderata. It turns out that this kind of inconsistency tolerance gives us a known logic. The result is important because it shows that lp is adequate not only as a logic of inconsistency, but as the logic of inconsistency generated by pre-existing consistency. For in our models the`ground' for truth is still the possible world. The impossible worlds are`epiphenomenal'. Truth at an impossible world is determined completely by truth at the possible worlds in which it consists. There is no more to inconsistency in these propositional models.
Quanti ers
We h a v e seen how to model inconsistent belief and other inconsistent propositions in propositional languages. The result agrees with Priest's logic of paradox. However, beliefs have more logical structure than is exhibited by propositional logic. The predicate calculus is another degree of logical structure useful in examining content of beliefs. The addition of predicates and quanti ers to the picture makes things more complex for our project. Again we will start with our classical models. a; w F n t 1 t n i hkt 1 k a ; : : : ; k t m k a i 2 k F n k w a; w A^B i a; w A and a; w B a; w A _ B i a; w A or a; w B a; w A i a; w 6 A a; w 8xA i a 0 ; w A for each x-variant a 0 of a. 2 If identity is among the predicates, we x the interpretation k=k of identity to be the function which returns the identity relation on D for each w orld w.
Note that we have xed our attention on constant domain models. This is a simplifciation, but one which i s c hie y to simplify presentation. Note too that predicates can vary in extension from world to world but functions cannot. The generalisation to non-rigid functions is simple too. Now, we could de ne truth and falsity at worlds sets of possible worlds just as before. The generalisation to predicates and quanti ers is immediate. However, some inconsistencies will remain true at no worlds possible or im- This is simply the necessity of true identity statements and the impossibility o f false identity statements, when the terms involved are rigid designators. Simply identifying worlds" is not going to introduce the inconsistency c = d.
However, it's clear that another sort of identi cation will do it. We can identify c and d. If we do that, then we can hold that c and d are identical after all. We are motivated to extend our de nition of ways things can't be to allow the identi cation of objects as well as worlds. However, not just any equivalence relation will do. If f is a function, and if c and d are identi ed, then it makes sense to identify fc and fd too, at least if f is to act as a function in the impossible world under construction. We will assume that our equivalence relations are congruence relations under the functions in the original model, so that the functions remain to act as functions on the impossible worlds. Of course, this is a choice. We need not require this if we don't wish to | however considering the alternate possibility here is one we will leave for another time. This construction, is inspired by the`collapsing' construction of Priest, which constructs inconsistent lp models from consistent models 6 .
The only clauses in this de nition which need comment are the base clauses. In our worlds, the domain is the same as the domain in the original predicate model. However, a claim like F x y is true either not only when the pair ha; bi of objects denoted by x and y are in the extension kF k of F, but also when a and b are identi ed" by with other objects c and d which are in the extension of F.
As before, there is a corresponding notion of an lp-evaluation in predicate calculus. Now, each predicate F n has an extension kF n k + and an anti-extension kF n k , . These extensions together cover perhaps with some overlap the product D n of n-tuples from the domain. The constraint on identity is that its extension is the identity relation on the domain. Its anti-extension may o v erlap with the extension. So all objects are self-identical and some might also be non-self-identical. Valuations are relative to assignments of variables, and we have the following straightforward conditions to add to the usual clauses for the propositional connectives 1 2 v a F n t 1 t n i k t 1 k a ; : : : ; k t n k a 2 k F n k + 0 2 v a F n t 1 t n i k t 1 k a ; : : : ; k t n k a 2 k F n k , 1 2 v a 8 xA i 1 2 v a A for each x-variant a 0 of a 0 2 v a 8xA i 0 2 v a A for some x-variant a 0 of a lp-validity of arguments is de ned just as before. We h a v e the same result as before, on the predicate level. Proof Overview The proof is both tedious and notationally complex. However it has the same structure as the propositional case. Firstly, y ou can show that any possible worlds model gives rise to an lp-model, which makes true exactly the same propositions. This ensures that if `l p A then P A. This is rather straightforward. You simply identify the objects`identi ed' by the congruence relation , and proceed in the natural way to get an lp-model.
For the other direction, we need to`unwrap' an lp-model into a consistent family of possible worlds, with the one domain, with the one interpretation of function symbols, and with extensions of predicates varying from world to world. For this, the technique is surprisingly simple in concept, but rather technical in detail. The idea is to take the domain D 0 of the extended model to be the objects in the domain D of the lp-model, plus a few more to deal with objects which are non-self identical. For any object taken to be non-self identical by the lp-model, add one new object its shadow to which it is related by . That is enough for . Functions are interpreted just as they were in the lp-model, except for shadows. If a shadow is in the input of a function, the function treats it as the object of which it is a shadow. In other words, functions ignore the di erence between shadow and substance, and they output only substantial objects. Functions so de ned respect -equivalence, so this de nition is permissible. For predicates, we let an extension of a predicate approximate an lp-extension anti-extension pair just when anything the classical extension takes to be true, so does the lp-extension, and anything the classical extension takes to be false, so does the anti-extension taking shadows into account, of course, as they're in our domain. We h a v e a classical possible world for any family of approximating extensions. The whole set of these families of extensions, together with the equivalence relation is our impossible world. The beautiful thing is: This de nition works! The impossible world takes to be true exactly those propositions true in the lp-model. The proof is an induction on the complexity of propositions. For those who prefer a more detailed proof, the detail is in the appendix to this paper.
Interpretation
What have w e a c hieved? Let's start by considering what we have not achieved. The construction of this paper is not the nal answer for a semantics of belief. All worlds, whether possible or impossible, contain all logical truths, and people certainly need not believe all logical truths. Perhaps this might be remedied by considering incompleteness dually with inconsistency, in the manner of my 8 . Even with this possible modi cation, more needs to be said about the nature of belief modelled in this way. It is integral to this account that beliefs are closed under some kind of logical consequence. This means that we are not considering explicit belief, something akin to the notion of commitment. Much more must be done to make this a truly useful model.
Granting this weakness, we h a v e a c hieve d a n umber of things. Firstly, W e have models for lp in which the primitive notions are consistent possible worlds. We used the same raw machinery as is available to those who use classical possible worlds. We h a v e used this machinery to construct a notion of truth in a world" which allows inconsistent worlds just as much as consistent ones. However, inconsistent w orlds are not mysterious entities, or merely theoretical devices constructed using some unintelligible logic. Impossible worlds are just more than one possible world taken together. If w and v are two di erent w a ys the world can be, then the world can't be like w and v taken together. That's inconsistent. All we have done is constructed a way to understand how two worlds like w and v clash, in such a w a y a s t o s h o w h o w the clash between w and v is not the same as the clash between two di erent w orlds, w 0 and v 0 . Both impossibilities exhibit contradictions, but they exhibit di erent contradictions. They are di erent impossible worlds.
However, we noted that this kind of impossibility is but one kind of impossibility. Another is found not by superimposing di erent worlds. Another notion can be found by superimposing di erent objects. In this way, other impossibilities can be modelled.
Secondly, W e h a v e shown that these two di erent kinds of identi cation are su cient to model the pre-existing logic lp. We h a v e some grip, therefore, in what kinds of inconsistencies are allowed by the paraconsistent logic lp. In the event of adding new connectives to the language of lp, w e might nd that di erent sorts of`identi cation', or other techniques again are required to model the arising inconsistency using a classical base. One which comes to mind is the addition of intensional operators. It may be that we might h a v e to consider the identi cation of di erent accessibility relations in order to treat inconsistent modal claims.
Thirdly, Lewis, in his Logic for Equivocators" 3 shows how t o interpret paraconsistent logics like lp as logics for equivocation. On his intepretation, we a c hieve inconsistency by allowing the extensions of our predicates to vary. In some part of our speech, the expression might mean one thing, in another, something else. It's clear how w e might appear to contradict ourselves when we do this.
In our models for lp we get by without changing the meanings of our predicates at all. They are just as xed as they are in classical possible worlds models. True, the extensions of predicates vary from world to world, but that's simply the trivial fact that objects have properties contingently. There is no equivocation on this analysis. The extensions of predicates in our new models remain just as they were in the original classical possible worlds models. The inconsistency arises by taking the world to be in two inconsistent w a ys, or taking objects to be the same which are as a matter of fact di erent.
Finally, w e h a v e seen a way w e enjoy the fruits of both paraconsistent and classical logic. In our classical possible worlds models, classical rst-order consequence is available as it always was. The addition of impossible worlds | not as extra ontology, but rather as a new way of looking at what was always there | gives us a new, paraconsistent, notion of logical consequence. If this helps people understand the formalism of paraconsistent logic, and some of the ideas underlying it, then this paper will have served its purpose. 3 the inconsistent extensions of predicates from the lp-model. We'll say that the extension jjF jj of F on the domain D 0 approximates the extension jjF jj + and the anti-extension jjF jj , on the domain D just when if he 1 ; : : : ; e n i 2 j j F jj then he 1 ; : : : ; e n i 2 j j F jj + , and if he 1 ; : : : ; e n i 6 2 j j F jj then he 1 ; : : : ; e n i 2 j j F jj , .
In other words, any judgment that the approximating extension makes, is also made by the lp-extension or anti-extension keeping in mind the unravelling of the domain. An approximating extension family is an extension of D 0 for each predicate in the language other than identity such that each extension approximates the extension and anti-extension of the lp-model. The worlds in our classical model are simply the approximating extension families. So, adapting our notation somewhat, we h a v e a set X of approximating extension families, such that for any w 2 X, and any predicate F, jjF jjw is an extension on D 0 approximating the extension and anti-extension of F in D 0 . We will show that taking this as our model, for any assignment a of variables on D 0 and for the congruence relation de ned above, that for every formula A, a; ; X + A if and only if 1 2 v a A and a; ; X , A if and only if 0 2 v a A. The proof is an induction on the complexity o f A as in the propositional case. The conjunction, disjunction and negation clauses are as before, so we need attend only to the atomic and the quanti er cases.
Firstly, a; ; X + F n t 1 t n if and only if for some objects d i 2 D, where d i j j t i jj a , hd 1 ; : : : ; d n i 2 j j F n jjw for some w 2 X. Now since jjF n jjw approximates the lp-extension and anti-extension of F, s o h d 1 ; : : : ; d n i 2 j j F n jj + , and so, hjjt 1 jj a ; : : : ; jjt n jj a i 2 j j F n jj + , b y the behaviour of . Now jjt i jj a = jjt i jj a , so hjjt 1 jj a ; : : : ; jjt n jj a i 2 jjF n jj + , giving 1 2 v a F n t 1 t n as desired. Conversely, if 1 2 v a F n t 1 t n , we have hjjt 1 jj a ; : : : ; jjt n jj a i 2 jjF n jj + . There is some extension jjF n jjw approximating the lp-extension and anti-extension for which hjjt 1 jj a ; : : : ; jjt n jj a i 2 j j F n jjw. Select such an extension i. e. such a w . It follows that a; ; X + F n t 1 t n , a s w 2 X . The case for the anti-extension is identical.
We need treat identity separately, as it is interpreted as identity on the domain as desired. The case for the existential quanti er is dual, and this completes the proof.
